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Plutarch's Portrait of Socrates
JACKSON P. HERSHBELL
Since the recent studies of K. DOring, it is clear that there was a renewal of
interest in the person of Socrates in the first and second centuries A.D.^
Such an interest is reflected, for example, by Dio of Prusa's speeches on
Socrates {Or. 54 and 55), and by frequent references to him in the works of
Seneca and of Epictetus. Indeed, as DOring observed in Exemplutn Socratis,
a study of Socrates' influence on the Cynic-Stoic popular philosophy of the
early Empire, Plutarch was influenced by and contributed much to his
contemporaries' concerns with Socrates,^ writing at least three works on
Socrates, two of which are lost: A Defense of Socrates ('AnoXoyia hnkp
ZcoKpdioTx;), and On the Condemnation of Socrates (Oepl xfii; ZcoKpdTOU(;
v(ni<p{oeco<;).3 A third work. On the Sign of Socrates (flEpl -cou ScaKpaxoug
5ai^ovio\) orDe genio Socratis) is still extant, and has recently received
great attention.'* Moreover, the first of the Platonic Questions
' K. Doling, "Sokrates bei Epiklel" in Studia Plalonica. Festschrift fur Hermann Gunderl
(Amsterdam 1974) 195-226. See also his Exemplum Socratis: Studien zur
Sokralesnachwirkung in der kynisch-stoischen Popularphilosophie derfrUhen Kaiserzeil und im
friihen Christentum = Hermes Einzelschriften 42 (Wiesbaden 1979). For the importance of
Socrates in later Greek thought, see also W. Schmid and O. Siahlin, Geschichle der griechischen
Literatur, Pt. I, Vol. HI: Die klassische Periode der griechischen Lileratur (Munich 1940) 276-
77.
^ Doring, Exemplum Socratis, 9-11, briefly mentions aspects of Plutarch's treatment of
Socrates, but he is mainly concerned with Seneca, Epictetus, and Dio of Prusa, and has little on
Plutarch.
These are No. 189 and No. 190 respectively in the so-called Lamprias Catalogue of
Plutarch's works, on which see K. Ziegler, Plularchos von Chaironeia (Stuttgart 1964) 60-64 =
s.v. "Plutarchos," /?£21. 1 (1951) cols. 696-702.
^For example, by A. Corlu, Plutarque, Le dimon de Socrate (Paris 1970); A. Aloni,
"Osservazioni sul De genio Socratis di Plutarco," Museum Criticum = Quademi dell' Inslitulo di
Filologia classica dell' Universitd di Bologna 10-12 (1977) 233-41, and A. Aloni, "Ricerche
sulla forma letteraria del De genio Socratis di Plutarco," Acme 33 (1980) 45-112; M. Riley,
"The Purpose and Unity of Plutarch's De genio Socratis" GRBS (1977) 257-73; D. Babut, "Le
dialogue de Plutarque Sur le dinwn de Socrate. Essai d'interpr^uuon," BAGB (1984) 51-76; K.
Doring, "Plutarch und das Daimononion des Sc4crates (Plut., de genio Socratis Kap. 202-04),"
Mnemosyne 31 (1984) 376-92; and P. Desideri, "II De genio Socratis di Plutarco: Un esempio
di 'storiografia tragica,'" ArAenaeum; Studi periodici di Pavia 62 (1984) 569-85. A. Barigazzi
is currently completing a study of Plutarch's De genio Socratis, a version of which was presented
at a conference of the International Plutarch Society held in Athens, June, 1987 [see infra. No.
14].
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(nXa-ccoviKa C,i\x-(\\iaxa, 999C-10(K)E) deals with the problem of why
god commanded Socrates to act as midwife to others, but prevented him
from himself begetting.5
Speculation on Plutarch's lost treatises is futile. Possibly they were
directed against Polycrates' Accusation of Socrates (KatTiyopCa
ZcoKpd-couq), but as Doring noted, this matter "entzieht sich unserer
Kenntnis."^ Yet the extant De genio Socratis, and numerous references to
Socrates in the Moralia and Lives, deserve attention, and contribute much
toward a reconstruction of Plutarch's portrait of Socrates. Hence, this
study's purpose is to present a comprehensive and detailed examination of
Plutarch's treatment of Socrates, in which problems concerning Plutarch's
sources and reasons for referring to Socrates are considered. It is hoped that
such a study provides insights into an era when Socrates was once more in
vogue, and illuminates Plutarch's own thinking as a representative of the
Academy.''
For the moment, source questions require brief consideration: Plutarch
knew the works of Plato and of Xenophon quite well.* That these two
authors' accounts of Socrates were almost definitive for later antiquity, was
stressed by G. C. Field and others,' and Plutarch's derivation of many
* For an excellent introduction to Quaesl. Plat., see H. Chemiss, Plutarch's Moralia XDI, Pt.
I in the Loeb Qassical Library, (Cambridge, Mass. 1976) 2-17. The text, translation, and notes
are also quite valuable. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are from the Loeb Qassical
Library volumes, hereafter LCL.
* Doring, Exemplum Socratis, 2, note 5. For more on Polycrates, see chap. 4 of A. H.
Chroust, Socrates, Man and Myth (London 1957), E. R. Dodds, Plato, Gorgias (Oxford 1959) 28
ff.. and W.K.C. Guthrie, Socrates (Cambridge 1971) 11 ff. = /4 History ofGreek Philosophy, Pt
2, Vol. m (Cambridge 1969) 311 ff., hereafter //GP//.
' See Doring, Exemplum Socratis, 7-8. For the so-called Old Academy, there is no extant
evidence of Socrates' importance. Beginning with ArcesQaus, however, there is evidence for
interest in Socrates' disclaimer to knowledge and his use of the elenchus. Plutarch represented
so-called Middle Platonism, on which see J. Dillon, The Middle Plalonists (London 1977) 184-
230.
* For Plutarch's knowledge of Plato, see the still valuable study of R. M. Jones. The
Platonism ofPlutarch (Menasha, Wisconsin 1916), and the many references in W. C. Helmbold
and E. N. O'Neil, Plutarch's Quotations, APA Monograph 19 (Oxford 1959) 56-63. For
Xenophon, ibid., 75-76, and Ziegler, Plutarchos, 286 = RE 21.1, col. 923, who affirms that
Plutarch knew the writings of Xenophon (whom he considered a phUosopher) "wirklich gut und
griindlich."
' See G. C. Field, "Socrates and Plato in post-AristoteUan Tradition," CQ 18 (1924) 127 ff.
Aristotle and Aristophanes are often considered sources for the historical Socrates. Aristotle,
however, probably relied on Plato, Xenophon, and other Socratics for his information, and
Aristophanes was not concerned with impartial examination of Socrates. For a judicious
account of Aristotle and the comic poets, see Guthrie, Socrates, 35-37 = HGPH, 355-57. A
useful treatment of Aristotle as a source for Socrates is T. Deman, Le timoinage d'Aristote sur
Socrale (Paris 1942), who collected Aristotle's texts on Socrates, and who gave a summary (1 1-
21) of previous scholarship on Socrates.
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reports on Socrates from Plato's dialogues is beyond reasonable doubt.
There are, for example, likely references to the Apology at 1116F and
1117E; to the Phaedo at 16C, 17F, 499B, 607F, 934F, and 975B; to the
Symposium at 632B, 707A, 710C, 823D, and 1117E; to the Theaetetus at
999C ff., and to the Meno at 93B.^° Moreover, in combining historical
narrative with philosophical discussion in De gen. Soar., Plutarch used the
Phaedo as a model, and various parallels between both works have often
been noticed.^' Plutarch also relied on Xenophon's Symposium and
Memorabilia as sources, e.g., the former at 124E, 130F, 40 IC, 630A,
632B, 709E, 711E, and the latter at 124D, 328E, 513D, and 661F. In
addition to works of Plato and of Xenophon, Plutarch was familiar with
Aristotle's "Platonic writings" (see 118C, most likely a reference to
Aristotle's On Philosophy)}'^ Demetrius of Phalerum's Socrates {see Aristid.
1. 2 and 27. 3),'3 and with Panaetius' Socrates {Aristid. 1 and 27. 3). In this
latter work Panaetius apparently denied that Socrates had a second wife, and
it was perhaps due to Panaetius' influence that Socrates as a thinker who
"brought philosophy down from the skies" (see Cic. Tusc. 5. 4. 10) became
a popular belief.''' Plutarch's other sources, e.g., at 486E, 512F, and 516C,
are unknown, but the majority of his reports remain traceable to Plato and
Xenophon.
That Plutarch's interest in Socrates was more than biographical, is well
illustrated by a passage in Quaestiones convivales VIII. 1 (717B ff.), where
he states that "on the sixth of Thargelion we celebrated the birthday of
Socrates, and on the seventh that of Plato." These dates also furnished
Plutarch and his company with their topics: days on which some eminent
persons were bom, and stories of births from divine parents. Later in the
symposium, Florus,'^ a friend of Plutarch very familiar with the
'" See the notes on these passages in the appropriate LCL volumes. References to Socrates
and Plato's Apology are also in the probably spurious teller of Condolence to Apollonius
(Consolalio ad Apollonium). On this work, see Ziegler, Plutarchos, 158-65 = RE 21. 1 cols.
794-802.
" See, for example, Riley, GRBS 18 (1977) 258, or R. Hiizel, Der Dialog, Vol. H (Leipzig
1895)148-51.
'^ See R. Westman, Plutarch gegen Kolotes = Acla Philosophica Fennica 7 (1955) 282-83.
On Demetrius and Peripatetic interest in Socrates, see Doring, Exemplum Socratis, 4-5
and Schmid-Stahlin, Geschichle, 276.
'• See Guthrie, Socrates, 98 = HGPH, 418, M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa, Vol. I (Goltingen 1947),
and Schmid-Stahlin, Geschichle, 239. According to Plutarch, the story that Socrates had a
second wife, Myrto, was doubted by Panaetius (Arislid. 27).
•' On Horus, see Ziegler, Plutarchos, 51-52 = RE 21. 1, cols. 687-88, and C. P. Jones,
Plutarch and Rome (Oxford 1971) 49. According to Jones, Horus "exhibits the same
antiquarian tastes that had amused Vespasian long ago." It was through Florus that Plutarch
obtained Roman citizenship.
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philosophies of Plato and of Aristotle, claims that Apollo by Socrates'
agency (6ia IcoKpd-tot)^) made Plato heal greater ailments and illnesses
than those cured by Asclepius (717D-E). For Plutarch himself, philosophy
had practical results, and he did not believe that it consisted of ex cathedra
pronouncements, or of learned commentaries. Philosophy involved all of
daily life, and at An seni respubl. ger. sit. 796D, he writes:
Socrates at any rate was a philosopher, although he did not set out
benches or seat himself in an armchair or observe a fixed hour for
conversing or promenading with his pupils, but jested with them, when it
so happened, and drank with them, served in the army, or lounged in the
market-place with some of them, and finally was imprisoned, and drank the
poison. He was the first to show that life at all times and in all parts, in
all experiences and activities, universally admits philosphy.
(H. N. Fowler's translation)
The above passage demonstrates well Plutarch's concern for ethics or
practical morality, and his conviction that philosophy is, above all, the art
of living well.'* Similar views about Socrates are expressed at Quaest. Plat.
999E, De curios. 516C, and Adv. Col. 1117D-E. These passages reflect
not only a "Zeitgeist," but also Plutarch's personal beliefs, beliefs often
formed or held in opposition to rival philosophical schools. A clear
illustration of this phenomenon is the Adversus Cololem. In order to
understand Plutarch's polemic against Colotes, it must be remembered that
Plutarch was probably a life-long opponent of Epicureanism, and that
Socrates was much maligned by the Epicureans, e.g., by Zeno of Sidon,
who considered Socrates scurra Atticus}"^ and by Colotes in his "On the
Point that Conformity to the Views of the Other Philosophers Actually
Makes it Impossible to Live."'* When beginning his defense of the
philosophers attacked by Colotes, Plutarch specifically mentions the
"insolent rudeness" of Colotes' critique of Socrates (1108B). As R.
Westman noticed, Colotes' attack on Socrates was enough "einen
iiberzeugten Sokrates-Verehrer vor den Kopf zu stossen."" After Plutarch's
'* D. Babut calls attention to Plutarch's Interest in practical philosophy, an interest which is
among "des traits communs des I'^poque hellfinistique," Plutarque et le Sloicisme (Paris 1969)
276 f.
'^ R. Flaceliere's thesis that there was an evolution in Plutarch's attitude toward
Epicureanism seems untenable. For his views, see "Plutarque et I'epicurisme," Epicurea, in
memoriam Hectoris Bignone, (Genoa 1959) 197-215, and for criticism, see H. Adam, Plutarchs
Schrift non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum = Sludien zur antiken Philosophie 4
(Amsterdam 1974) 3. For the Epicurean attack on Socrates, see Schmid-Slahlin, Geschichte der
griechischen Literatur, Pt, I, Vol. lU, 276, and Westman, Plutarch gegen Kolotes, especially 60-
66 and 274-75.
'* The translation of the tiUe is that of the LCL, on which see B. Einarson and P. De Lacy,
Plutarch's Moralia XTV (Cambridge, Mass. 1967) 153 ff. The probably definiuve study of this
work is R. Westman, Plutarch gegen Kolotes.
" Westman. Plutarch gegen Kolotes, 123.
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initial remark that Colotes' manner of "presenting Socrates with 'grass' and
asking how comes it that he puts his food in his mouth and not in his ear,"
might cause laughter when thinking of Socrates' "gentleness and kindness"
(TtpaoTTjTa Kal xapiv),^'' he discusses Colotes' charges in detail, providing
more information about Colotes' book than in any other section of Adv.
Col. (see 1116E-19C). Plutarch considers three matters in Colotes'
treatment of Socrates: 1) the famous Delphic oracle in which Socrates was
declared the wisest of mortals (1116E-17C); 2) Socrates' belief that sense
perception is not accurate or trustworthy (1117D-18B; and 3) Socrates'
inquiry into the nature of human beings (ti av0pco7i6(; eo-ci), and the
famous Delphic inscription "know yourself (1 118C-19C).2'
Each of Colotes' charges is met by Plutarch with polemics against the
Epicureans. For example, Colotes' accusation that Chaerephon's report on
the Delphic oracle is nothing but "a cheap and sophistical tale" (to TeAicoq
oocpio'ciKov Kttl (popTiKov 6iTiYr|(xa, 1116F) is rebutted as follows: if this
was a cheap sophist's trick, then adulation of Epicurus by his followers is
equally cheap and sophistical. Tu quoque criticism is also in Plutarch's
response to Colotes' attack on Socrates' views of sense perception, which
are discussed at some length. Plutarch concludes: "of these matters Colotes
will give us an occasion to speak again" (1118B-C), presumably in his
account of the Cyrenaics and the Academy of Arcesilaus at 1 120F-21E and
1123B-24B.22
Plutarch was angered by Colotes' "blasphemies" of Socrates (1117E),
and Colotes' critique of Socrates' alleged scepticism especially disturbed
him. Now some of Colotes' criticisms of Socrates are similar to those
directed against Arcesilaus (see 1121F ff.), and hence there is reason for
thinking that Colotes' treatment of Socrates as a Sceptic was partially
influenced by Arcesilaus' views, and that Colotes' general accusation that the
philosophers made life impossible, is a variant of his attack on the
Academic Sceptics.^^
Little is known about Arcesilaus, who was probably scholarch of the
Academy when attacked by Colotes,^^ but Plutarch reports that sophists
contemporary with Arcesilaus accused him of foisting his scepticism on
Socrates, Plato, Parmenides, and Heraclitus (see 1121F-22A).25 Hence, in
^ Einatson and De Lacy, LCL XTV, 195, translate the phrase as "imniffled wit" (1 108B).
^' Each of Colotes' charges is discussed in detail by Westman who plausibly observes that
Colotes derived his information about Socrates from Plato's dialogues. Yet Colotes apparently
realized that Plato sometimes used Socrates as a spokesman for his own views. See Westman,
Plutarch gegen Kololes, 63, note 1.
^ On Plutarch's defense of ArcesUaus. ibid., 76-79. and 293-294.
^ See the remarks of Einarson and De Lacy, LCL XIV, 153-57.
^See Westman, Plutarch gegen Kololes, 77, note 3; LCL XIV, 154, note a; and Doring,
Exemplum Socratis, 9.
" The "sophists" were probably the Theodoreans and Bion. See i,CL XFV, 277, note e. See
also Westman, Plutarch gegen Kololes, 294.
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treating Socrates as a Sceptic, Colotes seems to agree with an Academic
tradition possibly going back to Arcesilaus (cf. Cic. Acad. post. 1. 4. IS-
IS). In any case, Colotes attacked Socrates for denying the "plain evidence
of the senses" (see 1 117F), and for considering sense perception unreliable.
Was the basis for Colotes' polemic, then, a Sceptic interpretation of
Socrates, and does Adversus Colotem, together with other works of
Plutarch, show that Plutarch himself was an Academic Sceptic? This
composite question can probably be answered in the negative.^^ First, in
defending Arcesilaus against the charge of foisting his own belief about "the
impossibility of infallible apprehension on Socrates," Plutarch asserts at
1122A that Socrates and other thinkers did not need such an interpretation,
and "we are thankful to Colotes and everyone who shows that the Academic
reasoning came to Arcesilaus as an ancient tradition (avcoSev tikeiv eig
'ApKEOiXaov)." Second, Plato's tremendous influence on Plutarch cannot
be overlooked, and is far more important than that of any other thinker. For
example, at De and. poet. 17 D-F Plutarch argues that the poetic art is not
concerned with truth, and that truth about divine matters is very hard to
obtain, as Empedocles, Xenophanes, and Socrates realized.^ In support of
his mention of Socrates, Plutarch probably relies on Plato's Phaedo (69D).
Also at Quaest. Plat. 999E-F Plutarch emphasizes Socrates' aversion to
dogmatism:
So Socrates with his refutatory discourse (xov eXeyKtiKov Xoyov) like a
purgative medicine by maintaining nothing claimed the credence of others
when he refuted them, and he got the greater hold on them because he
seemed to be seeking the truth along with them, not himself to be
defending an opinion of his own.
(H. Chemiss's translation)
A similar opinion about Socrates is expressed at Quomodo adulator ab
amico internoscatur llh, where Plutarch states that Socrates quietly took
young men to task, "not assuming he himself was exempted from
ignorance, but thinking that he along with them had to study virtue, and to
seek for truth. "^^ Moreover, the idea of Socrates as someone who treated not
the body, but purged "the ulcerous and corrupted soul" is found at Quaest.
Plat. lOOOC. As Chemiss noted, the source for this latter view of Socrates
is Plato's Sophist 230c-231b, and inspiration for the first of Plutarch's
^ J. Schroeter's belief that Plutarch was a Sceptic, Plularchs Stellung zur Skepsis (Greifswald
1911), has been well argued against by P. De Lacy, "Plutarch and the Academic Sceptics," CJ 49
(1953-54)79-85.
^^ Schroeter cites this passage, Plularchs Stellung, 24, as an example of Plutarch's
scepticism, but Plutarch is thinking of the Socrates of Plato's Phaedo. Earlier in De aud, poet.
(at 16C), Plutarch relies on the Phaedo when he reports that Socrates took up poetry and put
Aesop's fables into verses.
^ See also Adv. Col. 1 1 17D, and Chemiss, LCL Xffl, Pt. I, 22, note c.
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Quaest. Plat, is clearly Plato's Theaetetus.^ Nothing thus far indicates that
Plutarch's portrait of Socrates was based on anything other than Plato's
works.
Returning to Adv. Col. and to Colotes' polemic against Socrates:
when Colotes attacked Socrates for denying the reliability of sense
perception, he was probably not thinking of Socrates' often expressed
conviction that he knew nothing. According to R.Westman, Socrates'
disclaimer of knowledge was "allgemein und prinzipiell," whereas Colotes
attacked a specific 86^a on sense perception's reliability.^" Possibly
Colotes thought of Socrates' critique of knowledge as sense perception in
the Theaetetus (151e-186e), or still more likely, of Phaedo 83a, where
Socrates claims that lovers of knowledge realize that "the eyes and the ears
and the other senses are full of deceit (aTHXTrii;)." In brief, there are no good
reasons to look beyond Plato's writings either for Colotes' attack on
Socrates, or for Plutarch's views on Socrates. Plutarch himself was not an
Academic Skeptic, and his portrayal of Socrates goes back mainly to Plato,
and not to Arcesilaus.
Any interpretation of Socrates as an Academic or theoretical Skeptic
should also take account of Plutarch's other remarks on Socrates. At Adv.
Col. 1117A he is called "a zealot (GeoJiTiTtToi;, lit. 'inspired' or 'possessed')
for virtue," and Plutarch later mentions the importance of Socrates' teaching
for preservation of human society (1124D). Again, at 1126B Plutarch
commends Socrates' refusal to escape from prison,^' and his adherence to
Athens' decrees. Other incidents in Socrates' public life cited at Adv. Col.
11 17D are also in Plutarch's Alcibiades (7. 4-6). In brief, Socrates not only
conversed with his fellow citizens (see also De latenter viv. 1 128F) and cast
doubt on sense perception: he was a thinker with an active role in his
community, and a seeker after virtue.
This latter aspect of Plutarch's portrait also appears in Alcibiades.
^'^
Though Socrates competed with others for Alcibiades' affection, he
somehow mastered (eKpaxei) him to the extent that he respected only
Socrates (6. 1). Whenever Socrates found Alcibiades full of debauchery and
vanity (0pTj\|iecoi; Kal 5caw6TT|TO(;), he influenced him with his talk, and
Alcibiades learned ever more about his lack of virtue (6. 4). At Potidaea,
Socrates was Alcibiades' "tent-mate and comrade-in-action," and defended the
wounded man. Plutarch most likely draws on Plato's Symposium^^ to
portray Socrates in his Alcibiades as a person of action: he campaigned at
2' Ibid., 19 and 22, note a.
'° Westman, Plularch gegen Kolotes, 62 ff.
" Plutarch's words on Socrates' refusal to escape, "klingen," according to Wcstmann, "wie
ein Nachhall von Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 4," Plutarch gegen Kololes, 274-75.
'^ For a very readable account of the Alcibiades, see D. A. Russell, Plutarch (London 1972)
117-29.
'3 /hid., 118.
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Potidaea and at Delium (7. 4), and he was generally a restraint to the
ambitious Alcibiades.
After narrating these incidents, Plutarch mentions Socrates only once
more in Alcibiades, before the disastrous Sicilian expedition (17. 4):
Socrates the philosopher, however, and Melon the astrologer, are
said to have had no hopes that any good would come to the city from this
expedition; Socrates, as it is likely, because he got an inkling of the future
from the divine guide (xow Sainoviov) who was his familiar. . .
(B. Perrin's translation)
Some fourteen years after this expedition, both Socrates and Alcibiades were
A contrast like that between the ambitious, dissolute Alcibiades and the
serene, self-controlled Socrates is at De tranq. 466D-67C, where Plutarch
briefly compares Socrates with the legendary Phaethon. In this "central
passage" of De tranq. an., Plutarch claims that reason and wisdom (to
(ppoveTv) produce contentment whatever life's circumstances may be.'^ A
series of paired examples (TiapaSeiYnata) supports this thesis: Alexander
contrasted with Crates, Agamemnon with Diogenes, and Socrates with
Phaethon. In each pair, the difference between contenUnent and discontent
depends on reason and wisdom, and the philosopher is meant to be the more
fortunate: Socrates conversed philosophically with friends in prison,
whereas Phaethon, gone to heaven, wept "because no one would deliver to
him his father's horses and chariots."^^ Alcibiades' discontented life is not
unlike Phaethon's, and in both cases Socrates exemplified the life of reason
and reflection.
The friendship or love between Socrates and Alcibiades introduces a
common theme of Middle Platonic literature: that of Eros, and especially
Socrates' epcoTiicri xiyyr[P For not only in the Alcibiades, but also in the
Amatorius (primarily chaps. 13-21),^* and in Quaest. Plat. 1. 4 (lOOOD-E),
^ In Plutarch's "comparison" (auyKpiai?) of Alcibiades and Coriolanus, not a word is
mentioned about Socrates.
^* See D. A. RusseU, Plutarch, 24-25.
'* The pairing of Socrates and Phaethon may be Plutarch's own, but as D. A. Russell noted
{ibid. 24-25) Socrates and Phaethon also appear as examples of wisdom and folly in De exilio
607F. Perhaps the contrast was an "inherited commonplace."
" See De Pythiae oraculis 406A, where it is remarked that "it is not righteous nor honourable
to say that the Academy and Socrates and Plato's congregation were loveless, for we may read
their amatory discourses (kb-^oic, eptmiKoii;)." See also Doring, Exemplum Socratis, 10-11,
who notes that Plutarch's friend Favorinus composed a work on Socrates and his epojTiifn(;
^* Commenting on Plutarch's views on love, A. Wardman, Plutarch's 'Lives (London 1974)
61, writes: "In the Amatorius, however, which is Plutarch's version of Plato's Symposium, the
writer does expressly idealize love between man and woman as preferable to a pederastic
relationship. There is some disagreement here between the Plutarch of the Lives and the
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Plutarch deals with Socrates' "amatory art." In this latter work, Plutarch
discusses Socrates' role as midwife, and asserts that Socrates' view of
wisdom (oo(p{a), or what "he called passion for the divine and intelligible"
((ttiv) Tiepi TO Geiov Ktti voTi-cov epco-tvKTiv), is for mortals not a matter
of procreation or of discovery, but of reminiscence (avd|i.vTioi(;). Plutarch
also claims that Socrates taught nothing, but by arousing perplexities in
young men, he helped them to deliver their "innate conceptions" (eV<p'OTOi
votjoek;).^' Socrates called this procedure "obstetric skill" (ixaicoxiKTiv
lexvTiv). Platonic views of Socrates are obviously in Plutarch's mind, for
explicit reference to the Theaetetus is at the beginning of Quxiest. Plat. 1
(997D), and Socrates' beliefs about "wisdom," and the power of Eros are
traceable to the Republic and Symposium.
Plutarch's Amatorius, one of his "loveliest creations," treats the concept
of Eros at great length.'"' Without detailed analysis of the dialogue, the
following observations seem sufficient. Plutarch's view of Eros in the
Amat. is basically that of the Phaedrus, where Socrates claims that Eros "is
a god or something divine" (0e6<; ti hi Geiov, 242d-e). Hence, Plutarch's
insistence on Eros' divinity (756A-63F) differs from the view of Eros in the
Symposium, where Diotima claims that Eros is not a god, but a daimon, or
a being intermediate between gods and mortals.'" Second, Eros' function,
according to Plutarch at 764E-66B and 766E-67B, is to guide souls of
lovers by recollection (dvd|iVTioi(;) to Beauty "pure and genuine" (KaGapov
Kttl dve\)5E(; . . . KccKkoq, 765A). Differences between the sun and Eros
are noted: The sun in visible, Eros is intelligible; the sun directs attention
away from intelligibles to sensibles, whereas Eros does the opposite (764D-
E). In brief, in these sections of the Amat. Plutarch works with material
taken from Plato, especially the Phaedrus (Socrates' palinode in 244a-57b),
and the Symposium (the Diotima-Socrates passage, 201d-12a). Yet
Plutarch does not merely borrow from Plato—he mingles his own thoughts
with those of his master, e.g., the "quite un-Platonic" references to fair
women and their importance in awakening the soul to beauty (766E ff.).'*^
Plutarch of the Moralia; yet it is probably Hue to say that both in the Lives and in the Amatorius
his main target is pedreastic sexual indulgence."
'' The conceptions are not "inbred" as they were for the Stoics. See Chemiss, LCL XHl, Pt.
I, 28, note c.





zu seinen schonsten Schopfungen zahlt und auch kompositionell, in der Verschlingung der
novellistischen Handlung mit der Erorterung des durch sie gelieferten Themas, besonders
gelungen isL"
^' I am especially indebted to H. Martin Jr.'s discussion for this and other observations on the
Amatorius. See his "PluUrch, Plato, and Eros" CB 60 (1984) 82-88.
•^ Ibid., 84.
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In the Amatorius and Quaestiones Platonicae passages noted above,
emphasis is on Eros' role in "recollection" (dvdixvrioiq) of the eternal
Forms. Despite this similarity, the works are very different in genre, and in
their treatment of Socrates. In Quaest. Plat. I, Socrates' role as midwife is
the focus of the inquiry, whereas in the Amat. Socrates is mentioned only
once at (762D) in connection with Anytus' friendship with Alcibiades and
his prosecution of Socrates.'*^ Given the works' different natures, Plutarch's
reticence about Socrates in the Amat. may not be surprising. But it is
possible to go further, as H. Martin, Jr. has argued.
The Amatorius opens with conversation between Plutarch's son
Autobulus and Havian.''^ Autobulus had agreed to narrate a dialogue learned
from his father (748E ff.), and within this narrative Plutarch himself
assumes the role of main speaker. Commenting on Plutarch in the Amat.,
H. Martin, Jr. wrote:
... by casting himself as his own spokesman in the Amatorius, a role
Plato has reserved for Socrates in the Symposium and the Phaedrus,
Plutarch is thereby presenting himself as Socrates' successor . . .''^
Martin's remark is persuasive. It calls attention to Socrates and Plato as
Plutarch's spiritual ancestors, and explains his avoidance of Socrates' name
other than at 762D. In brief, the Amatorius is an important work for
Plutarch's understanding of the Platonic-Socratic concept of Eros.
Another popular subject of Middle Platonic literature was Socrates'
daimonion; e.g., Apuleius' De deo Socratis, esp. chaps. 17-20, and
Maximus of Tyre's lectures (AiaXe^eiq), 8 and 9, represent interest in this
phenomenon. There was apparently a "Damonisierung" in the religious and
philosophical beliefs of the early principate,'** and so, not surprisingly,
Plutarch devoted De genio Socratis to this topic. But his interest in
Socrates' daimonion was not confined to this treatise. In Quaest. Plat. I
(999D-E and lOOOD), Plutarch refers to Socrates' "divine sign,'"*'' and his
references will be considered after examination ofDe gen. Socr.
In addition to A. Corlu's work on De gen. Socr. (1970), two other
studies especially helpful for understanding this dialogue are those of M.
Riley and D. Babut, both concerned with problems of the unity and purpose
of De gen. Socr.'^^ They seem agreed that the dialogue's true subject is
neither the liberation of Thebes, nor the nature of Socrates' daimonion.
^' As Wardman noted, Plutarch's Lives, 202-04, Plutarch says little either in the extant
Moralia or Lives about Socrates' trial. In Nicias 23, for example, he mentions Protagoras' exile
and Anaxagoras' imprisonment, and "for good measure in his illustralion he throws in the trial
of Socrates."
** On Flavian, see Ziegler, Plutarchos, 39^tO = /?£ 21 . 1 , cols. 675-76.
"^ Martin, CB 60 (1984) 87.
** See Doring, Exemplum Socratis, 1 1
.
'" See Chemiss, LCL Xm, Pt. I, 21, note e.
^ See note 4 of this study for bibliographical details.
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Rather a main concern of De gen. Socr. is the relationship between the
"practical life" (7ipaKTiK6<; pioq) and the "contemplative" or "theoretical"
life (0ecoptitik6(; (Jioq). Beyond this point, their interpretations diverge.
Riley saw tension between the two kinds of life "resolved completely in
Socrates," who "was the only man who could combine both the role of the
complete philosopher . . . and the role of the active citizen.'" In bridging
the "gap" between these roles, Socrates' daimonion had decisive influence,
for "Socrates displayed concretely the type of soul that a daimon could
guide."^" Babut, however, found in De gen. Socr. a fundamental opposition
between the practical and contemplative lives, and regarded Socrates not as
combining them, but as the "divine" man, the pure philosopher who, like
Epameinondas, "refuse les compromissions de Taction poUtique."^'
Both scholars perhaps overstated their positions, and review of
Plutarch's portrayal of Socrates in De gen. Socr. is in order. First mention
of Socrates is at 588B, where Galaxidorus responds to Theanor's dependence
on a divine sign (5ai|i6viov) as an example of "humbug and superstition"
(x-ucpoi) Kai 8eioi5ai|iov{a(;). For him, philosophy is a matter of reason
without recourse to divination and visions; Socrates is the true philosopher
who avoided "humbug."'^
The seer Theocritus objects, and cites Socrates' own daimonion as proof
of divine guidance. His ensuing exchange with Galaxidorus is interrupted
by Polymnis, who reports that some believed Socrates' divine sign was a
sneeze which encouraged or prevented action contingent on its occurrence
(581A-B).53 Polymnis disbelieves this explanation, because Socrates'
actions and convictions were not those of one guided by sneezes or voices,
but "by a higher authority and principle to noble conduct" (58 ID).
While discussing Socrates' sign, Polymnis mentions some biographical
particulars: Socrates' life-long poverty,^'* his safe retreat from Delium in
response to his daimonionP his prediction of Athenian failure in Sicily, his
refusal to escape from prison, and his fearlessness toward death. These
biographical details are probably important, as will be seen, for Plutarch's
portrayal of Socrates in De gen. Socr.
*' Riley, GRBS 18 (1977) 268-69.
50 Ibid., 272.
5' Babul, B/IGB (1984) 72-73.
5^ Galaxidorus probably offers only a partial view of Socrates. For Galaxidorus, and all
persons of the dialogue, see Corlu, Le demon de Socrale, 13-22. Galaxidorus is discussed in
18-19 et passim. It is interesting to note that "humbug" (TV(po<;) appears in Plutarch's other
descriptions of Socrates. The term was used by the Cynics, and may represent Cynic influence.
See I. Nachov, "Der Mensch in der Philosophic der Kyniker," in Der Mensch als Mass der
Dinge, ed. R. MuUer (Beriin 1976) 375 and 380.
On this view attributed to Terpsion of Megara, see Corlu, Le dimon de Socrale, 50.
^ Socrates' poverty is mentioned elsewhere by Pluurch, e.g. at 84F of Quomodo quis suos in
virtute senlial profeclus.
55 Together with Alcibiades and Laches.
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Galaxidorus then expresses interest in Simmias' views on Socrates, and
briefly rebuts Polymnis by asserting that experts in divination see great
significance in minor signs such as sneezes, just as readers learn about wars
and rulers from the alphabet's letters, which mean nothing to illiterates. A
sign can have divine origin; it is an instrument of a god used to
communicate with mortals (581F-82C).
Discussion of Socrates' daimonion ends temporarily with the entrance
of the mysterious visitor, Theanor.^^ At 588B it resumes with Simmias'
interpretation of Socrates' sign. For him, this was a voice ((pcovrj) from the
divine realm, and a guide in life (-nyeiiova itpoi; tov Piov, 589F). Socrates'
intellect (yoxx^) and soul were guided by a superior intellect and more divine
soul (-uTio voti KpEiooovoq . . . Ktti v^xfiq GeioiEpa^, 589B), and so
Socrates did not need to interpret the "symbols" of human speech in order to
have contact with the divine.
Simmias then relates the experiences of Timarchus, also Socrates'
disciple, in Trophonius' cave at Lebadeia." Briefly, after a vision of the
cosmos, Timarchus hears a voice describing the nature of daimones and of
human souls (591D-92E). Every soul has a higher part which many call
intellect or mind (vovq), but which should really be called the daimon
(59 IE). "Daimonic" influence on human souls is as follows. There are
souls so immersed in the body and distracted by passions, that they pay
almost no attention to their daimones. Timarchus sees them moving about
confusedly (59 ID). Other souls are partly submerged in the body and give
their daimones some control, but move in jerks, since their daimones must
occasionally pull on the reins guiding them (591E-92B). Still other souls
obey their daimones from birth, and are inspired (GeokXijtovhevov, 592C),
or become obedient because of their nurture and education (5ia Tpo<pfiv Kal
TtaCSE-oaiv, 592A).
After Simmias' report of Timarchus' vision, Theanor gives a somewhat
different account of daimones?^ He explains how the gods guide the best
mortals directly "by language expressed in symbols" (A^oyco 8la crunP6A,cov,
593B). Other mortals are guided by the signs and omens from which
divination arises. According to Theanor, daimones are souls released from
the cycle of rebirth and who assist mortals near their cycle's end, just as
athletes help their successors (593D-94D). And for Theanor, Socrates' soul
has almost reached its goal.
Despite the complexities and obscurities of Simmias' and Theanor's
speeches, the following observations seem apposite. First, Socrates' soul,
like that of Hermodorus of Clazomenae (592C), was bom inspired, and
remained obedient to its daimon's guidance. Both Socrates and Hermodorus
^ On Theanor, see especially Corfu, Le dimon de Socrale, 20-22.
" For a clear summaiy of Timarchus' vision. See Riley, GRBS 18 (1977) 264 ff.
'' Riley, ibid., 266 remarks that ihe accounts of Simmias and Theanor are "both equally exact
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were persons to whom, according to Simmias, daimones spoke directly.
The character (Ti9o<;) of each was "calm and undisturbed" (dGopvPov Kai
VT|VEnov, 589D). And the souls of those with understanding (vouv exeiv,
591F), Timarchus sees as floating on high, not submerged in the body, or
concerned with earthly affairs.
Now Polymnis had previously sketched Socrates as such a person,
mentioning his poverty and courage toward death (581C ff.), and one theme
of De gen. Socr. is restraint of the passions, and the importance of
philosophical training. At 584A Epameinondas claims no disgust at
poverty, and later argues (584E ff.) that desires or passions must by subdued
by reason (utio xot> Xoyoti KoA,a^o|a,£va(;). Similarly, in Simmias' report
of Timarchus' vision, daimones beat the soul until subdued (KoXa^onevn)
like a tame animal (592B).
Philosophy provides training needed to overcome the desires, and
Polymnis gave Epameinondas the "best upbringing" in philosophy (585D),
a goal of which is freedom from passion (dTtaGriq, 588D, applied by
Simmias to Socrates), or an undisturbed and calm character (589D).
Socrates and Epameinondas are thus similar in being above human desires,
and the latter, often considered a "Boeotian Socrates,"^' had received a
"distinguished and exceptional education" (7iai6e{a<; Siacpopov Kal
Ttepnxfiq, 576D). In Simmias' account, Socrates also belongs to human
beings who are "divine and exceptional" (GeCok; Kal TtepixToiq dv8pdoi,
589C),^°and who alone receive direct messages from daimones. At 593B
Theanor mentions mortals distinguished with "a peculiar and exceptional
schooling" (iSiai; iwoc, ical ntp\x\r\c, jiaiSaYcoyiaq). As Babut noted,
the term "exceptional" (jtepuToq) seems significant in De gen. Socr.^^ Like
Socrates, Epameinondas also belongs to exceptional persons guided through
life by their daimones. They are among the few, select mortals to whom
divinity manifests itself directly (cf. 593C).
Moreover, the long discussion between Epameinondas and Theanor on
poverty and the value of riches (chaps. 13-14), emphasizes not only
Epameinondas' moral character, but also the parallels between him and
Socrates. For the poverty espoused by Epameinondas was an important part
of Polymnis' description of Socrates at 581C: Socrates freely "remained
poor throughout his life, when he could have had money which the donors
would have been delighted and thankful to see him accept."
Hence, in De gen. Socr. Plutarch sketches portraits of "divine" persons
such as Socrates, Epameinondas, and Theanor. Their moral or spiritual
superiority was due to direct contact with the divine world, and to their
freedom from physical desires. But there are also humans totally enslaved
5' See Babut, B/IGB (1984) 57.
^ At Adv. Col. 1 1 1 9C Plutarch concludes his defense of Socrates and mentions Epicurus'
attack on the gods and "godlike men" (6eioi(; dv5pd<n).
*' Babul, B/IGB (1984) 57.
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by their passions, and who like, Thebes' tyrannical rulers (see 578B), are
blind to signs warning them of a dire fate. Between these extremes are
Thebes' liberators, who lack freedom from their passons despite their
courage and other moral qualities. That this "tripartition de I'humanit^"
exists in De gen. Socr., has been noticed by Babut.^^ But his critique of
Riley and others who see Socrates as the philosopher and citizen, a figure
reconciling the theoretical and practical lives, is less convincing. Babut
seems to forget Polymnis' description of Socrates (at 581D-E) when he
writes that he is never presented as "un homme d'action ni meme comme un
citoyen."^^ Moreover, if there is opposition between theory and practice in
Plutarch's view of Socrates in De gen. Socr., it is not reflected in other
works, e.g., in Adv. Col., An sent respubl. ger. sit. (769D), or Quaest.
Plat. I, where Plutarch refers to Socrates' examination of others as a way of
freeing them from "humbug" (ixxpov, 999E), almost Galaxidorus' view of
Socrates in De gen. Socr. Socrates is the critic of human opinions, not a
contemplative thinker. Plutarch emphasizes divine influence on Socrates in
De gen. Socr., but this does not prevent him from being a friend to
Alcibiades and others involved in Athenian affairs.
In sum, the following matters seem certain: first, Socrates' divine sign
and the liberation of Thebes are two main subjects of De gen. Socr., though
their exact relationship in Plutarch's mind remains uncertain. Second, the
importance of philosophical education and restraint of the passions is
stressed, and both Socrates and Epameinondas are similar in demeanor and
guided by their daimones. Moreover, in the dialogue's philosophical
sections, Plutarch's account oi daimones is not unlike those ofDe sera num.
vin. (563E-68A) and of De facie in orb. lun. (942C-45D).64 Third,
whatever the purpose(s) of De gen. Socr. may have been, Plutarch tells an
exciting story of political intrigue and revolution, the tension which is often
relieved or increased by discussion of Socrates' divine sign. Despite the
obscurities of De gen. Socr., the views of Riley and others seem
convincing: Socrates is not a pure or theoretical philosopher, but one who
combined philosophical thinking with civic duty and responsibility to
others, and who unlike many human beings was led through life by his
daimon.
Thus far, examination of Plutarch's portrait of Socrates has shown
considerable indebtedness to Plato. But both in De gen. Socr. and Quaest.
Plat. I there appear to be divergences from Plato's account of Socrates'
^^ Ibid., 69.
*' [bid. ,71, note 6. His criticism of Riley, who considered Socrates' prediction of disaster in
Sicily as political, is niggling. Babut says it is not political, because "Plutarque prend soin de
preciser qu'eUe est fait en priv6, a quelques amis." The retreat at Delium is not quite explained
by Babut.
*• See Riley, GRBS 18 (1977) 264, note 16. Socrates is mentioned only once in Defac. in
orb. lun. (at 923F) where there is brief reference to Socrates' myth about the earth in the Phaedo
1 106 ff. See Chemiss, LCL XD, 140, note a.
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daimonion. According to Plato {Ap. 3 ID), Socrates' sign always held him
back from what he thought of doing, and never urged him forward (del
dnoTipeTtEi . . . , npoTcpenei 8e o-utiote . . .; cf. Phdr. 242C). At Quaest.
Plat. 999E, however, Plutarch refers to a "divine and spiritual cause" which
guided or instructed (ucpriyrioaTo) Socrates to examine others. Cherniss
noted that txpTiyTioaxo cannot be used of the sign described by Plato's
Socrates, and referred to Polymnis at De gen. Socr. 58 IB, according to
whom Socrates daimonion either deterred or prompted him ( . . . kcoXuov r\
KeXzvov).^^ Such a description of Socrates' sign seems more consonant
with Xenophon's reports, namely, that Socrates' inner voice always told him
what he should or should not do {Mem. 4. 3. 12; 1. 1. 4; Apol. 12-13).**
Yet even in Plato's account, Socrates' sign did not always oppose or stop
him from a course of action {Ap. 40B), and even gave him some mantic
powers (Phdr. 242C). In view, however, of Xenophon as a likely source for
other reports of Plutarch on Socrates, it is quite possible that his description
of Socrates' daimonion was also influenced by Xenophon.
Another example of Xenophon's influence on Plutarch is at De cap. ex
inim. util. 90E, where in this originally extempore address*'' Plutarch states
that Socrates bore with Xanthippe "who was irascible and acrimonious," for
he thought that if he got along well with her, he would succeed in getting
along with others. The source for Xanthippe's bad temper was probably
Xenophon {Mem. 2. 2. 7), who reports her son's complaints about her nasty
disposition, and who in the Sym. (2. 10) has Antisthenes ask Socrates why
if he believed women to be as teachable as men, he had not trained
Xanthippe, but continued to live with "the most troublesome woman of all
time."** Other examples of Xenophon as Plutarch's source for Socrates can
be cited; e.g., at De tuenda sanitate praecepta 124D-E Plutarch relates
Socrates' advice against eating or drinking things which cause us to eat or
drink when not hungry or thirsty, and adds that Socrates considered dancing a
pleasant exercise. These reports are most likely based on Xenophon's
Memorabilia 1. 3. 6 and Symposium 2. 17-20, respectively.*' Xenophon
is often a source for Plutarch's or his friends' remarks on Socrates in
Quaestiones convivales, and at 629E Xenophon is called "the Socratic."
Given the nature of Plutarch's own Quaest. conviv., it is not surprising to
discover likely references to Xenophon's Symposium,''^ e.g., at 632A and
711 A, and some material in Quaest. conviv. is found elsewhere in Plutarch's
^ See Cherniss, LCL Xm, R I. 21, note e.
^ See E. Edelstein, Xenophonlisches und platonisches Bild des Socrates (Berlin 1935) 18.
Her chapter on "Vergleich des xenophontischen und platonischen Sokratesbildes," 63-11
,
remains especially worthwhile.
^ See Ziegler. P/u/arc/iaj, 167 = R£;21.1, col. 804
** On Xanthippe, see Guthrie, Socrates, 63.
® See notes a and c in LCL H, 228.
™ See, for example, F. Fuhrmann, Plularque, Oeuvres morales, DC, PL I (Paris 1972), p.
XXL
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works, e.g., Socrates' advice against dishes tempting to eat when not hungry
(661F, 124D-E, 5130, and 521E) or his praise of the dance (711D, 124E,
and BOE).""
Before concluding, it is important to return to Plutarch's remarks on
Socrates in the Lives. A. Wardman noted that "Socrates appears in the
Lives only in passing references," and nowhere does Plutarch deal with the
charge that Socrates corrupted the young.''^ Wardman's observation
emphasizes the fact that Socrates' trial received almost no attention in the
extant Lives or Moralia. Perhaps Wardman is correct in claiming that
Plutarch considered the charge of corrupting the youth not "worth refuting in
detail."''^ At the end of Phocion (38. 2), Plutarch suggests that the
Athenians realized their error in killing Phocion was as serious as the
execution of Socrates. Most likely, Socrates' trial and execution were
treated in detail by Plutarch in his lost Defense of Socrates and On the
Condemnation of Socrates, mentioned earlier in this study.
It is now time to conclude this attempted reconstruction of Plutarch's
portrait of Socrates. If Schmid, DOring, and others are correct, Plutarch's
works very much reflect his era's renewed interest in Socrates. Plutarch
wrote in a tradition established by Plato and Xenophon, both of whom
admired Socrates. Plutarch was not, however, bound by this tradition, and
responded to it creatively by composing several works in which he
transformed inherited material for his own purposes, among which were
rebuttal of Epicureanism (Adv. Col.), the creation of an historical "Novelle"
(De gen. Socr. ),'''* and an unusual treatment of the Platonic concept of Eros
(Amat.).
That Plutarch's primary sources were Plato and Xenophon is certain.
He was, of course, extremely well read, and probably also used works of
Aristotle, Demetrius of Phalerum, and Panaetius. With access to these and
possibly other sources on Socrates, he makes many anecdotal references to
Socrates throughout the Moralia and Lives. His main emphasis, however,
is on Socrates as a "divine" man who followed his daimon throughout life
{De gen. Socr.), performed his duties as an Athenian {De gen. Socr. and
Adv. Col.), challenged his fellow citizens to reflect, while acting as a
midwife {Quaest. Plat.), and who was somewhat sceptical about human
beliefs and sense perception. Perhaps Plutarch regarded himself as Socrates'
successor {Amat.). Certainly there is evidence for thinking that Plutarch,
like some of his contemporaries, considered Socrates a model or paradigm
for the best human life. Socrates followed his daimon, and led a busy life
" It is quite likely that Plutarch makes use of his kypomnemata in these passages. On his
hypomnemata, see Chemiss, LCL XIH, Pt D, 398 ff.
^^ Wardman, Plutarch's Lives, 202.
"
Ibid. 202.
"• SeeZiegler,/'/u/arcW, 205 = RE 21. 1, col. 841.
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while maintaining self-control and the capacity for quiet reflection.
Plutarch's own life was not wholly different''^
University ofMinnesota
^' I wish to thank Hubert Martin, Jr., University of Kentucky, and Philip A. Stadter,
University of North Carolina, for reading an earlier version of this paper, and making
suggestions for improvement.

